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CERT Advisory CA-2000-01 Denial-of-Service Developments




CERT Advisory CA-2000-01 Denial-of-Service Developments







CERT Advisory CA-2000-01 Denial-of-Service Developments

This advisory is being published jointly by the CERT Coordination Center and
the Federal Computer Incident Response Capability (FedCIRC).

  Original release date: January 3, 2000
  Source: CERT/CC and FedCIRC
  
  A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
  
Systems Affected

    * All systems connected to the Internet can be affected by
      denial-of-service attacks.
      
I. Description

Continued Reports of Denial-of-Service Problems

  We continue to receive reports of new developments in
  denial-of-service tools. This advisory provides pointers to documents
  discussing some of the more recent attacks and methods to detect some
  of the tools currently in use. Many of the denial-of-service tools
  currently in use depend on the ability of an intruder to compromise
  systems first. That is, intruders exploit known vulnerabilities to
  gain access to systems, which they then use to launch further attacks.
  For information on how to protect your systems, see the solution
  section below.
  
  Security is a community effort that requires diligence and cooperation
  from all sites on the Internet.
  
Recent Denial-of-Service Tools and Developments

  One recent report can be found in CERT Advisory CA-99-17.
  
  A distributed denial-of-service tool called "Stacheldraht" has been
  discovered on multiple compromised hosts at several organizations. In
  addition, one organization reported what appears to be more than 100
  different connections to various Stacheldraht agents. At the present
  time, we have not been able to confirm that these are connections to
  Stacheldraht agents, though they are consistent with an analysis
  provided by Dave Dittrich of the University of Washington, available
  at
  
  http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/stacheldraht.analysis
         
  Also, Randy Marchany of Virginia Tech released an analysis of a
  TFN-like toolkit, available at
  
  http://www.sans.org/y2k/TFN_toolkit.htm
         
  The ISS X-Force Security Research Team published information about
  trin00 and TFN in their December 7 Advisory, available at
  
  http://xforce.iss.net/alerts/advise40.php3
         
  A general discussion of denial-of-service attacks can be found in a
  CERT/CC Tech Tip available at
  
  http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/denial_of_service.html
         
II. Impact

  Denial-of-service attacks can severely limit the ability of an
  organization to conduct normal business on the Internet.
  
III. Solution

  Solutions to this problem fall into a variety of categories.
  
Awareness

  We urge all sites on the Internet to be aware of the problems
  presented by denial-of-service attacks. In particular, keep the
  following points in mind:
    * Security on the Internet is a community effort. Your security
      depends on the overall security of the Internet in general.
      Likewise, your security (or lack thereof) can cause serious harm
      to others, even if intruders do no direct harm to your
      organization. Similarly, machines that are not part of centralized
      computing facilities and that may be managed by novice or
      part-time system administrators or may be unmanaged, can be used
      by intruders to inflict harm on others, even if those systems have
      no strategic value to your organization.
    * Systems used by intruders to execute denial-of-service attacks are
      often compromised via well-known vulnerabilities. Keep up-to-date
      with patches and workarounds on all systems.
    * Intruders often use source-address spoofing to conceal their
      location when executing denial-of-service attacks. We urge all
      sites to implement ingress filtering to reduce source address
      spoofing on as many routers as possible. For more information, see
      RFC2267.
    * Because your security is dependent on the overall security of the
      Internet, we urge you to consider the effects of an extended
      network or system outage and make appropriate contingency plans
      where possible.
    * Responding to a denial-of-service attack may require the
      cooperation of multiple parties. We urge all sites to develop the
      relationships and capabilities described in the results of our
      recent workshop before you are a victim of a distributed
      denial-of-service attack. This document is available at
      
       http://www.cert.org/reports/dsit_workshop.pdf
               
Detection

  A variety of tools are available to detect, eliminate, and analyze
  distributed denial-of-service tools that may be installed on your
  network.
  
  The National Infrastructure Protection Center has recently announced a
  tool to detect trin00 and TFN on some systems. For more information,
  see
  
  http://www.fbi.gov/nipc/trinoo.htm
         
  Part of the analysis done by Dave Dittrich includes a Perl script
  named gag which can be used to detect stacheldraht agents running on
  your local network. See Appendix A of that analysis for more
  information.
  
  Internet Security Systems released updates to some of their tools to
  aid sites in detecting trin00 and TFN. For more information, see
  
  http://www.iss.net/cgi-bin/dbt-display.exe/db_data/press_rel/release/1
         22899199.plt
         
Prevention

  We urge all sites to follow sound security practices on all
  Internet-connected systems. For helpful information, please see
  
  http://www.cert.org/security-improvement
         http://www.sans.org
         
Response

  For information on responding to intrusions when they do occur, please
  see
  
  http://www.cert.org/nav/recovering.html
         http://www.sans.org/newlook/publications/incident_handling.htm
         
  The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation is conducting
  criminal investigations involving TFN where systems appears to have
  been compromised. U.S. recipients are encouraged to contact their
  local FBI Office.
    _________________________________________________________________
  
  We thank Dave Dittrich of the University of Washington, Randy Marchany
  of Virginia Tech, Internet Security systems, UUNet, the Y2K-ICC, the
  National Infrastructure Protection Center, Alan Paller and Steve
  Northcutt of The SANS Institute, The MITRE Corporation, Jeff Schiller
  of The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Jim Ellis of Sun
  Microsystems, Vern Paxson of Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, and
  Richard Forno of Network Solutions.
  ______________________________________________________________________
  
  This document is available from:
  http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-01.html
  ______________________________________________________________________
  
CERT/CC Contact Information

  Email: cert@cert.org
         Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
         Fax: +1 412-268-6989
         Postal address:
         CERT Coordination Center
         Software Engineering Institute
         Carnegie Mellon University
         Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
         U.S.A.
         
  CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
  Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other
  hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
  
Using encryption

  We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
  Our public PGP key is available from
  
  http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key
      
  If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
  information.
  
Getting security information

  CERT publications and other security information are available from
  our web site
  
  http://www.cert.org/
      
  To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send
  email to cert-advisory-request@cert.org and include SUBSCRIBE
  your-email-address in the subject of your message.
  
  Copyright 2000 Carnegie Mellon University.
  Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information can be
  found in
  
  http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html
      
  * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
  Patent and Trademark Office.
  ______________________________________________________________________
  
  NO WARRANTY
  Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
  Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
  Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
  implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
  fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
  results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
  does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
  patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
    _________________________________________________________________
  
  Revision History

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