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From:Rapid 7 Security Advisories <advisory_(at)_rapid7.com>
Date:22.04.2006
Subject:Rapid7 Advisory R7-0022: Symantec Scan Engine Known Immutable DSA Private Key

_______________________________________________________________________
                    Rapid7, LLC Security Advisory
_______________________________________________________________________

Rapid7 Advisory R7-0022
Symantec Scan Engine Known Immutable DSA Private Key

  Published:  April 21, 2006
  Revision:   1.0
  http://www.rapid7.com/advisories/R7-0022.html

  CVE: CVE-2006-0231

1. Affected system(s):

  KNOWN VULNERABLE:
   o Symantec Scan Engine v5.0.0.24

  KNOWN FIXED:
   o Symantec Scan Engine v5.1.0.7

  UNKNOWN (PROBABLY VULNERABLE):
   o All v5.0.x.x
   o Earlier versions

2. Summary

  Symantec Scan Engine exhibits a vulnerability in the way it
  generates the SSL private key used for protecting communications
  over TCP port 8005. This port is used to exchange sensitive
  configuration and control commands between the server and the
  administrative control application.

  While all data over this port is protected using SSL, Rapid7 has
  found that every installation of Symantec Scan Engine uses the same
  private DSA key. This immutable key cannot be changed by end users
  and can be extracted easily from any installation of this product.

  This design flaw renders the SSL protection useless. A
  man-in-the-middle attacker could easily intercept and decrypt all
  communications between Symantec Scan Engine and an administrative
  client.

  NeXpose, Rapid7's award-winning vulnerability assessment platform,
  checks for this vulnerability and other vulnerabilities we have
  discovered in Symantec Scan Engine. Visit http://www.rapid7.com
  to register for a free demo of NeXpose.

3. Vendor status and information

  Symantec Corporation
  http://www.symantec.com

  Symantec was notified of this vulnerability on January 17, 2006.
  They acknowledged the vulnerability, then provided us with a
  fixed version. Rapid7's advisory was publicly released on April 21,
  2006.

4. Solution

  Upgrade to Symantec Scan Engine v5.1.0.7 or later.

5. Detailed analysis

  Symantec Scan Engine's administrative client exchanges sensitive
  configuration information with the server using a proprietary
  protocol protected by SSL which runs by default on TCP port 8005.
  This built-in SSL server is used, for example, to transmit the
  administrator password hash when changing the password. It is
  crucial for this communication channel to remain private,
  authenticated, and reliable.

  A critical design error has been made in the way SSL protection is
  employed. The use of a particular DSA private key, pre-generated by
  Symantec, is enforced in their SSL server in all tested versions of
  Symantec Scan Engine. End users are offered no way to change the key,
  and the key itself can be relatively easily extracted from any
  installation. The key can be found in the file "servers.jar"
  (located by default in "C:\Program Files\Symantec\Scan Engine"),
  which contains a java keystore file "com/symantec/jsse/serverKeys"
  protected by the password "secret". The key entry is stored under
  the alias "server" and is protected by the password "secret".

  This known immutable key renders SSL protection useless since the
  private key is known to anybody (see below for the key in PEM
  format). All Scan Engine installations use the same key. For example,
  attackers can combine ARP or DNS spoofing attacks with the knowledge
  of the private key to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks.

  -----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
  MIIBuwIBAAKBgQD9f1OBHXUSKVLfSpwu7OTn9hG3UjzvRADDHj+AtlEmaUVdQCJR
  +1k9jVj6v8X1ujD2y5tVbNeBO4AdNG/yZmC3a5lQpaSfn+gEexAiwk+7qdf+t8Yb
  +DtX58aophUPBPuD9tPFHsMCNVQTWhaRMvZ1864rYdcq7/IiAxmd0UgBxwIVAJdg
  UI8VIwvMspK5gqLrhAvwWBz1AoGBAPfhoIXWmz3ey7yrXDa4V7l5lK+7+jrqgvlX
  TAs9B4JnUVlXjrrUWU/mcQcQgYC0SRZxI+hMKBYTt88JMozIpuE8FnqLVHyNKOCj
  rh4rs6Z1kW6jfwv6ITVi8ftiegEkO8yk8b6oUZCJqIPf4VrlnwaSi2ZegHtVJWQB
  TDv+z0kqAoGAE9rKDKa4eOROFXX1/jy7sLH34OGTbTmsqYoEBTJt8DolJkr6L4kf
  SyOzpIhKB440mmXZMQJbXy0WNBCGzPjq6OHpI60KuBTskWAtPBEGE1jiov/7jK9b
  wCt6sTBqo3Ux5ygyjuFQyt89d+qTp9761Z32OvaBq+IJvZYWNM8M/2ECFDLgCI85
  fJtA3mlq9Q1T6U36Kl7x
  -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----

  The private component of this DSA key is X:

  X = 0x32e0088f397c9b40de696af50d53e94dfa2a5ef1

  A tool such as ssldump can be used to confirm the validity of the
  private key as shown above, by manually comparing its public part to
  the DSA public key embedded in the SSL server's certificate
  displayed by ssldump.

6. Credit

  This vulnerability was discovered by Marc Bevand of Rapid7.

7. Contact Information

  Rapid7, LLC
  Email: advisory@rapid7.com
  Web: http://www.rapid7.com
  Phone: +1 (617) 247-1717

8. Disclaimer and Copyright

  Rapid7, LLC is not responsible for the misuse of the information
  provided in our security advisories. These advisories are a service
  to the professional security community. There are NO WARRANTIES with
  regard to this information. Any application or distribution of this
  information constitutes acceptance AS IS, at the user's own risk.
  This information is subject to change without notice.

  This advisory Copyright (C) 2006 Rapid7, LLC. Permission is hereby
  granted to redistribute this advisory, providing that no changes are
  made and that the copyright notices and disclaimers remain intact.

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