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securityvulnsSecurityvulnsSECURITYVULNS:DOC:13686
HistoryAug 02, 2006 - 12:00 a.m.

Barracuda Vulnerability: Hardcoded Password [NNL-20060801-01]

2006-08-0200:00:00
vulners.com
24

Title: Barracuda Hardcoded Password Vulnerability
Severity: High (Sensitive Information Disclosure)
Date: 01 August 2006
Version Affected: Barracuda Spam Firewall version 3.3.01.001 to 3.3.03.053
Discovered by: Greg Sinclair ([email protected])
Discovered on: 28 May 2006

Overview:
Barracuda Spam Firewalls (www.barracudanetworks.com) are vulnerable to
information disclosure which is made possible by a default guest password

Details:
The Barracuda Spam Firewalls from version 3.3.01.001 to 3.3.02.053 have a hardcoded password for the "guest" account in the Login.pm script. This script is called to validate any user who attempts to login to the barracuda's web interface (typically at http://<deviceIP>:8080 or
https://<deviceIP>). While the guest account has limited access, the following information can be obtained:

  • system configuration including IP accesses, admin IP ACLs
  • email message logs (but not the content of the messages)
  • version information of both spam/antivirus definitions and system firmware version

Used in conjunction with the vulnerability "Barracuda Arbitrary File
Disclosure" (NNL-20060801-02), the integrity of the system can be compromised. An attacker can use both vulnerabilities to download both
confidential emails as well as the configuration information (including the admin password).

Additionally, while some accounts such as "admin" are bound by user definable IP ACLs, the guest account is not. This means that sensitive
information can be disclosed to ANY IP address regardless of the user defined network restrictions.

Proof of Concept:
Enter the username "guest" into the login page of any open barracuda and the password "bnadmin99"

Recommendations:

  • Never allow your barracuda web interface to be accessible from untrusted networks (especially the Internet)

  • Upgrade to version 3.3.0.54 or later

Vendor Contact:
29 May 2006 - Initial Vendor Contact
24 June 2006 - Vendor replies with prospect of fix
17 July 2006 - NNL request status update, no reply
01 Aug 2006 - NNL releases vuln report, notifies vendor of release