Computer Security
[EN] securityvulns.ru
no-pyccku



Related information

  Grub, DiskCryptor, LILO, DriveCrypt, TrueCRYPT and Intel, IBM, HP BIOS disk ebcryption utilities information leak

  [IVIZ-08-005] IBM Lenovo BIOS Plain Text Password Disclosure

  [IVIZ-08-002] Hewlett-Packard BIOS Plain Text Password Disclosure

  [IVIZ-08-003] TrueCrypt Security Model bypass exploiting wrong BIOS API usage

  [IVIZ-08-007] DriveCrypt Security Model bypass exploiting wrong BIOS API usage

From:iViZ Security Advisories <advisories_(at)_iviztechnosolutions.com>
Date:01.09.2008
Subject:[IVIZ-08-004] Intel BIOS Plain Text Password Disclosure

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
[ iViZ Security Advisory 08-004                            25/08/2008 ]
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
iViZ Techno Solutions Pvt. Ltd.
                                           http://www.ivizsecurity.com
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------

* Title:     Intel BIOS Plain Text Password Disclosure
* Date:      25/08/2008
* Software:  Intel BIOS

* CERT temporary tracker : VU#604539

- --[ Synopsis:

   Like most BIOSes, Intel's firmware PE94510M.86A.0050.2007.0710.1559
   (07/10/2007) can be used to ask a password to users at boot time to
   implement a pre-boot authentication.

   The password checking routine of this firmware fails to sanitize the
   BIOS keyboard buffer after reading user input, resulting in plain
   text password leakage to local users.

- --[ Affected Software:

 * Intel Corp PE94510M.86A.0050.2007.0710.1559 (07/10/2007) BIOS
 (possibly others too)

- --[ Technical description:

   The BIOS's pre-boot authentication routines use the BIOS API to
   read user input via the keyboard. The BIOS internally copies the
   keystrokes in a RAM structure called the BIOS Keyboard buffer
   inside the BIOS Data Area. This buffer is not flushed after use,
   resulting in potential plain text password leakage once the OS
   is fully booted, assuming the attacker can read the password at
   physical memory location 0x40:0x1e.

- --[ Impact:

   Plain text password disclosure. Local access is required, but no
   physical access to the machine.

   The level of privilege required to retrieve the password from memory
   is OS dependant and varies from guest user under Microsoft Windows
   (any) to root user under most Unix based OSes.

- --[ Full Technical Whitepaper

   http://www.ivizsecurity.com/research/preboot/preboot_whitepaper.pdf

- --[ Vendor response:

 * Intel Product Security Incident Response Team (iPSIRT)  has
 aknowledged the vulnerability and is proactively working on a fix.

- --[ Credits:

   This vulnerability was discovered by Security Researcher
   Jonathan Brossard from iViZ Techno Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

- --[ Disclosure timeline:

 * First private disclosure to vendor on July 15th 2008
 * First vendor reply on July 15th 2008
 * CERT assigns tracker VU#604539 to the bug.
 * First Public disclosure at Defcon 16 on August 10th 2008

- --[ Reference:

   http://www.ivizsecurity.com/security-advisory.html


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32)

iD8DBQFIsnYakcchhz1mT/IRAofuAJ9+OeAETRi5pqFLhMhE9XDGIRwn7wCgjt65
tj++4trQVUCF/MWK1NWwwUY=
=MBpr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

About | Terms of use | Privacy Policy
© SecurityVulns, 3APA3A, Vladimir Dubrovin
Nizhny Novgorod

 
 



Rating@Mail.ru
test server