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  Огромная дыра в Interbase

From:CERT <cert_(at)_cert.gov>
Date:11.01.2001
Subject:Advisory CA-2001-01


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CERT Advisory CA-2001-01 Interbase Server Contains Compiled-in Back Door
Account

  Original release date: January 10, 2001
  Last revised: --
  Source: CERT/CC

  A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

    * Borland/Inprise Interbase 4.x and 5.x
    * Open source Interbase 6.0 and 6.01
    * Open source Firebird 0.9-3 and earlier

Overview

  Interbase is an open source database package that had previously been
  distributed in a closed source fashion by Borland/Inprise. Both the
  open and closed source verisions of the Interbase server contain a
  compiled-in back door account with a known password.

I. Description

  Interbase is an open source database package that is distributed by
  Borland/Inprise at http://www.borland.com/interbase/ and on
  SourceForge. The Firebird Project, an alternate Interbase package, is
  also distributed on SourceForge. The Interbase server for both
  distributions contains a compiled-in back door account with a fixed,
  easily located plaintext password. The password and account are
  contained in source code and binaries previously made available at the
  following sites:

         http://www.borland.com/interbase/
         http://sourceforge.net/projects/interbase
         http://sourceforge.net/projects/firebird
         http://firebird.sourceforge.net
         http://www.ibphoenix.com
         http://www.interbase2000.com

  This back door allows any local user or remote user able to access
  port 3050/tcp [gds_db] to manipulate any database object on the
  system. This includes the ability to install trapdoors or other trojan
  horse software in the form of stored procedures. In addition, if the
  database software is running with root privileges, then any file on
  the server's file system can be overwritten, possibly leading to
  execution of arbitrary commands as root.

  This vulnerability was not introduced by unauthorized modifications to
  the original vendor's source. It was introduced by maintainers of the
  code within Borland. The back door account password cannot be changed
  using normal operational commands, nor can the account be deleted from
  existing vulnerable servers [see References].

  This vulnerability has been assigned the identifier CAN-2001-0008 by
  the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) group:

         http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0008

  The CERT/CC has not received reports of this back door being exploited
  at the current time. We do recommend, however, that all affected sites
  and redistributors of Interbase products or services follow the
  recommendations suggested in Section III, as soon as possible due to
  the seriousness of this issue.

II. Impact

  Any local user or remote user able to access port 3050/tcp [gds_db]
  can manipulate any database object on the system. This includes the
  ability to install trapdoors or other trojan horse software in the
  form of stored procedures. In addition, if the database software is
  running with root privileges, then any file on the server's file
  system can be overwritten, possibly leading to execution of arbitrary
  commands as root.

III. Solution

Apply a vendor-supplied patch

  Both Borland and The Firebird Project on SourceForge have published
  fixes for this problem. Appendix A contains information provided by
  vendors supplying these fixes. We will update the appendix as we
  receive more information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the
  CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor
  directly.

  Users who are more comfortable making their own changes in source code
  may find the new code available on SourceForge useful as well:

         http://sourceforge.net/projects/interbase
         http://sourceforge.net/projects/firebird

Block access to port 3050/tcp

  This will not, however, prevent local users or users within a
  firewall's adminstrative boundary from accessing the back door
  account. In addition, the port the Interbase server listens on may be
  changed dynamically at startup.

Appendix A. Vendor Information

Borland

  Please see:

         http://www.borland.com/interbase/

IBPhoenix

  The Firebird project uncovered serious security problems with
  InterBase. The problems are fixed in Firebird build 0.9.4 for all
  platforms. If you are running either InterBase V6 or Firebird 0.9.3,
  you should upgrade to Firebird 0.9.4.

  These security holes affect all version of InterBase shipped since
  1994, on all platforms.

  For those who can not upgrade, Jim Starkey developed a patch program
  that will correct the more serious problems in any version of
  InterBase on any platform. IBPhoenix chose to release the program
  without charge, given the nature of the problem and our relationship
  to the community.

  At the moment, name service is not set up to the machine that is
  hosting the patch, so you will have to use the IP number both for the
  initial contact and for the ftp download.

  To start, point your browser at

         http://firebird.ibphoenix.com/

Apple

  The referenced database package is not packaged with Mac OS X or Mac
  OS X Server.

Fujitsu

  Fujitsu's UXP/V operating system is not affected by this problem
  because we don't support the relevant database.

References

   1. VU#247371: Borland/Inprise Interbase SQL database server contains
      backdoor superuser account with known password CERT/CC,
      01/10/2001, https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/247371
    _________________________________________________________________

  Author: This document was written by Jeffrey S Havrilla. Feedback on
  this advisory is appreciated.
  ______________________________________________________________________

  This document is available from:
  http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-01.html
  ______________________________________________________________________

CERT/CC Contact Information

  Email: cert@cert.org
         Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
         Fax: +1 412-268-6989
         Postal address:
         CERT Coordination Center
         Software Engineering Institute
         Carnegie Mellon University
         Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
         U.S.A.

  CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
  Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other
  hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.

Using encryption

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  http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key

  If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
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Getting security information

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  * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
  Patent and Trademark Office.
  ______________________________________________________________________

  NO WARRANTY
  Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
  Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
  Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
  implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
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    _________________________________________________________________

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  Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.

  Revision History
January 10, 2001:  Initial release

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