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  Серьезные уявзмиости в реализациях Kerberos

  Security Advisory: REMOTE ROOT VULNERABILITY IN GSSFTP DAEMON

  Advisory CA-2000-11

  Security Advisory: MULTIPLE DENIAL OF SERVICE VULNERABILITIES IN KRB4 KDC

  BUFFER OVERRUN VULNERABILITIES IN KERBEROS

From:CERT <cert_(at)_cert.gov>
Date:18.05.2000
Subject:Advisory CA-2000-06

CERT Advisory CA-2000-06 Multiple Buffer Overflows in Kerberos
Authenticated Services

  Original release date: May 17, 2000
  Last revised: --
  Source: The MIT Kerberos Team, CERT/CC
  
  A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
  
Systems Affected

    * Systems running services authenticated via Kerberos 4
    * Some systems running services authenticated via Kerberos 5
    * Systems running the Kerberized remote shell daemon (krshd)
    * Systems with the Kerberos 5 ksu utility installed
    * Systems with the Kerberos 5 v4rcp utility installed
      
Overview

  The CERT Coordination Center has recently been notified of several
  buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the Kerberos authentication
  software. The most severe vulnerability allows remote intruders to
  gain root privileges on systems running services using Kerberos
  authentication. If vulnerable services are enabled on the Key
  Distribution Center (KDC) system, the entire Kerberos domain may be
  compromised.
  
I. Description

  There are at least four distinct vulnerabilities in various versions
  and implementations of the Kerberos software. All of these
  vulnerabilities may be exploited to obtain root privileges.
  
Buffer overflow in krb_rd_req() library function

  This vulnerability is present in version 4 of Kerberos. It is also
  present in version 5 (in the version 4 compatibility code). This
  vulnerability can be exploited in services using version 4 or 5 when
  they perform version 4 authentication. This vulnerability may also be
  exploited locally via the v4rcp setuid root program of Kerberos 5.
  
  This vulnerability may be exploitable in version 4. This vulnerability
  is exploitable in version 5 in conjunction with the
  krb425_conv_principal() vulnerability, described below.
  
Buffer overflow in krb425_conv_principal() library function

  This vulnerability is present in version 5's backward compatibility
  code. This vulnerability is known to be exploitable in version 5 in
  conjunction with an exploit of the krb_rd_req() vulnerability.
  
Buffer overflow in krshd

  This vulnerability is only present in version 5. This vulnerability is
  not related to the previous two vulnerabilities.
  
Buffer overflow in ksu

  This vulnerability is only present in version 5, and is corrected in
  krb5-1.1.1 and krb5-1.0.7-beta1. The ksu vulnerability is unrelated to
  the other vulnerabilities.
  
The MIT Kerberos Team Advisory

  The MIT Kerberos Team described these vulnerabilities in detail in an
  advisory they recently issued. The text of this advisory is included
  below.
  
  |
  
SUMMARY

  Serious buffer overrun vulnerabilities exist in many implementations
  of Kerberos 4, including implementations included for backwards
  compatibility in Kerberos 5 implementations. Other less serious buffer
  overrun vulnerabilities have also been discovered. ALL KNOWN KERBEROS
  4 IMPLEMENTATIONS derived from MIT sources are believed to be
  vulnerable.
  
IMPACT

    * A remote user may gain unauthorized root access to a machine
      running services authenticated with Kerberos 4.
    * A remote user may gain unauthorized root access to a machine
      running krshd, regardless of whether the program is configured to
      accept Kerberos 4 authentication.
    * A local user may gain unauthorized root access by exploiting v4rcp
      or ksu.
      
DETAILS

  The MIT Kerberos Team has been made aware of a security vulnerability
  in the Kerberos 4 compatibility code contained within the MIT Kerberos
  5 source distributions. This vulnerability consists of a buffer
  overrun in the krb_rd_req() function, which is used by essentially all
  Kerberos-authenticated services that use Kerberos 4 for
  authentication. It is possible for an attacker to gain root access
  over the network by exploiting this vulnerability.
  
  An exploit is known to exist for the Kerberized Berkeley remote shell
  daemon (krshd) for at least the i386-Linux platform, and possibly
  others. The extent of distribution of this exploit is unknown at this
  time.
  
  Other buffer overruns have been discovered as well, though with less
  far-reaching impact.
  
  The existing exploit does not directly use the buffer overrun in
  krb_rd_req(); rather, it uses the buffer that was overrun by
  krb_rd_req() to exploit a second overrun in krb425_conv_principal().
  The krb_rd_req() code itself might not be exploitable once the overrun
  in krb425_conv_principal() is repaired, though it is likely that some
  other method of exploit may be found that does not require that an
  overrun exist in krb425_conv_principal().
  
VULNERABLE DISTRIBUTIONS AND PROGRAMS

  Source distributions which may contain vulnerable code include:
    * MIT Kerberos 5 releases krb5-1.0.x, krb5-1.1, krb5-1.1.1
    * MIT Kerberos 4 patch 10, and likely earlier releases as well
    * KerbNet (Cygnus implementation of Kerberos 5)
    * Cygnus Network Security (CNS -- Cygnus implementation of Kerberos
      4)
      
  Daemons or services that may call krb_rd_req() and are thus vulnerable
  to remote exploit include:
  
  krshd
         klogind (if accepting Kerberos 4 authentication)
         telnetd (if accepting Kerberos 4 authentication)
         ftpd (if accepting Kerberos 4 authentication)
         rkinitd
         kpopd
         
  In addition, it is possible that the v4rcp program, which is usually
  installed setuid to root, may be exploited by a local user to gain
  root access by means of exploiting the krb_rd_req vulnerability.
  
  The ksu program in some MIT Kerberos 5 releases has a vulnerability
  that may result in unauthorized local root access. This bug was fixed
  in krb5-1.1.1, as well as in krb5-1.0.7-beta1. Release krb5-1.1, as
  well as krb5-1.0.6 and earlier, are believed to be vulnerable.
  
  There is an unrelated buffer overrun in the krshd that is distributed
  with at least the MIT Kerberos 5 source distributions. It is not known
  whether an exploit exists for this buffer overrun. It is also not
  known whether this buffer overrun is actually exploitable.
  
WORKAROUNDS

  Certain daemons that are called from inetd may be safe from
  exploitation if their command line invocation is modified to exclude
  the use of Kerberos 4 for authentication. Please consult the manpages
  or other documentation for your Kerberos distribution in order to
  determine the correct command line for disabling Kerberos 4
  authentication. Daemons for which this approach may work include:
  
  krshd (*)
         klogind
         telnetd
         
  (*) The krshd program may still be vulnerable to remote attack if
  Kerberos 4 authentication is disabled, due to the unrelated buffer
  overrun mentioned above. It is best to disable the krshd program
  completely until a patched version can be installed.
  
  The v4rcp program should have its setuid permission removed, since it
  may be possible to perform a local exploit against it.
  
  The krb5 ksu program should have its setuid permission removed, if it
  was not compiled from krb5-1.1.1, krb5-1.0.7-beta1, or later code.
  Merely replacing the ksu binary with one compiled from krb5-1.1.1 or
  krb5-1.0.7-beta1 should be safe, provided that it is not compiled with
  shared libraries (the vulnerability is related to some library bugs).
  If ksu was compiled with shared libraries, it may be best to install a
  new release that has the library bug fixed.
  
  In the MIT Kerberos 5 releases, it may not be possible to disable
  Kerberos 4 authentication in the ftpd program. Note that only releases
  krb5-1.1 and later will have the ability to receive Kerberos 4
  authentication.
  
FIXES

  The best course of action is to patch the code in the krb4 library, in
  addition to patching the code in the krshd program. The following
  patches include some less essential patches that also affect buffer
  overruns in potentially vulnerable code, but for which exploits are
  somewhat more difficult to construct.
  
  Please note that there are two sets of patches in this file that apply
  against identically named files in two different releases. You should
  separate out the patch set that is relevant to you prior to applying
  them; otherwise, you may inadvertently patch some files twice.
  
  MIT will soon release krb5-1.2, which will have these changes
  incorporated.
  
PATCHES AGAINST krb5-1.0.x

  The following are patches against 1.0.7-beta1 (roughly). The most
  critical ones are:
  
  appl/bsd/krshd.c
         lib/krb4/rd_req.c
         lib/krb5/krb/conv_princ.c
         
  The rest are not as important but you may wish to apply them anyway
  out of paranoia. These patches may apply with a little bit of fuzz
  against releases prior to krb5-1.0.7-beta1, but there likely have not
  been significant changes in the affected code. These patches may also
  apply against KerbNet. The lib/krb4/rd_req.c patch may also apply
  against CNS and MIT Kerberos 4.
  
  [Patches to correct this issue in Kerberos version 5-1.0.x were
  included at this point in the MIT advisory. The CERT Coordination
  Center has made these patches available at the following link:
  
  http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-06/mit_10x_patch.txt
         
  -- CERT/CC]
  |
  
PATCHES AGAINST krb5-1.1.1

  The following are patches against 1.1.1. The most critical ones are:
  
  appl/bsd/krshd.c
         lib/krb4/rd_req.c
         lib/krb5/krb/conv_princ.c
         
  IMPORTANT NOTE: If you are upgrading to krb5-1.1.1 (or krb5-1.1, but
  we recommend krb5-1.1.1 if you are going to upgrade at all) and
  compile the source tree with the --without-krb4 option, then you will
  also want to install the patch to login.c that is also provided below.
  
  The rest are not as important but you may wish to apply them anyway
  out of paranoia.
  
  [Patches to correct this issue in Kerberos version 5-1.1.1 were
  included at this point in the MIT advisory. The CERT Coordination
  Center has made these patches available at the following link:
  
  http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-06/mit_111_patch.txt
         
  -- CERT/CC]
  |
  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  Thanks to Jim Paris (MIT class of 2003) for pointing out the
  krb_rd_req() vulnerability.
  
  Thanks to Nalin Dahyabhai of Redhat for pointing out some other buffer
  overruns and coming up with patches.
  
  The full text of the MIT Kerberos Team advisory is also available
  from:
  
  http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/krb4buf.txt
         
II. Impact

  The most significant impact of these vulnerabilities may allow a
  remote intruder to gain root access to systems running vulnerable
  services, including the KDC for the domain.
  
Buffer overflow in krb_rd_req() library function

  This vulnerability may be exploited by remote users to gain root
  privileges on systems running services linked against the vulnerable
  library. As MIT indicated, these services include (but may not be
  limited to):
  
  krshd
         klogind (if accepting Kerberos 4 authentication)
         telnetd (if accepting Kerberos 4 authentication)
         ftpd (if accepting Kerberos 4 authentication)
         rkinitd
         kpopd
         
  Local users can execute arbitrary code as root on systems where v4rcp
  is installed setuid root.
  
Buffer overflow in krb425_conv_principal() library function

  This vulnerability can be exploited by remote users in conjunction
  with the krb_rd_req vulnerability to gain root privileges on systems
  running services linked against the vulnerable library.
  
Buffer overflow in krshd

  Remote users may be able to execute arbitrary code as root on systems
  running a vulnerable version of krshd.
  
Buffer overflow in ksu

  Local users can can gain root privileges by exploiting the buffer
  overflow in ksu.
  
III. Solution

Apply a patch from your vendor

  Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.
  We will update the appendix as we receive more information. If you do
  not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor.
  Please contact your vendor directly.
  
Apply the MIT patches

  If you are running the Kerberos 5 distribution from MIT, and can
  rebuild your binaries from source, you can apply the source code
  patches from MIT to correct these problems.
  
  If you are running Kerberos version 4, you may be able to patch your
  source code based on the version 5 patch provided by MIT. Only the
  patches for the krb_rd_req() vulnerability need to be applied to
  version 4 to address the issues described in this advisory.
  
  With either version, you will need to recompile the libraries and the
  vulnerable programs (krshd and ksu). You will also need to recompile
  any programs that have been statically linked with the vulnerable
  libraries. In version 4, you should also recompile the KDC server
  software.
  
  These patches are available at:
  
  http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-06/mit_10x_patch.txt
         http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-06/mit_111_patch.txt
         
Disable version 4 authentication in version 5 if possible

  As suggested by MIT, version 4 authentication in some daemons can be
  disabled at run time by supplying command line options to these
  programs when started by inetd. This approach may work for the
  following daemons:
  
  krshd
         klogind
         telnetd
         
  This addresses the krb_rd_req() and krb425_conv_principal()
  vulnerabilities. Note that krshd may still be vulnerable to the krshd
  specific vulnerability described in this document.
  
Upgrade to MIT Kerberos 5 version 1.2

  The vulnerabilities described in this advisory will be addressed in
  Kerberos 5 version 1.2. This version will be available from the MIT
  Kerberos web site:
  
  http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/
         
Appendix A. Vendor Information

Microsoft Corporation

  No Microsoft products are affected by this vulnerability.
  
MIT Kerberos

  The MIT Kerberos Team advisory on this topic is available from:
  
  http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/advisories/krb4buf.txt
         
NetBSD

  NetBSD has two codebases for crypto software, a legacy of the US's
  export laws until recently (and also some patent issues).
  
  The crypto-intl tree intended for use by those outside the US was not
  affected.
  
  For the crypto-us tree,
    * krb5 was not affected
    * krb4 was affected, and has been fixed in NetBSD-current since
      Jeff's announcement; this fix is making it's way into the 1.4.x
      release branch. We will release an advisory and patches shortly.
      
  In summary, users of NetBSD releases 1.4.2 and earlier or -current up
  until yesterday, who have installed the crypto-us "secr" set and who
  have enabled kerberos4, are vulnerable.
  
OpenBSD

  OpenBSD uses the KTH Kerberos distribution, which has been reported to
  be not vulnerable.
  
Washington University

  We do not distribute any "default" binaries which uses Kerberos. In
  order to get Kerberos support, you must rebuild the software
  specifically to use Kerberos (the default build will not use
  Kerberos).
  
  We believe that the University of Washington IMAP and POP3 servers are
  not vulnerable. The message from MIT specifically stated that the
  problem was in the Kerberos 4 routines from MIT.
  
  Kerberos support in these servers is based upon Kerberos 5, not
  Kerberos 4. UW imapd/ipop3d only uses GSSAPI and Kerberos 5 calls;
  Kerberos 4 routines are never called.
  
  There is an unsupported, contributed code, module for Kerberos 4
  available in our software, but that is client only. We are not aware
  of the existence of any Kerberos 4 server code for UW imapd/ipop3d.
    _________________________________________________________________
  
  The CERT Coordination Center thanks Jeff Schiller and the MIT Kerberos
  Team for notifying us about this problem and their help in developing
  this advisory.
    _________________________________________________________________
  
  Cory Cohen and Jeff Havrilla were the primary authors of the CERT/CC
  portions of this document.
  ______________________________________________________________________
  
  This document is available from:
  http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-06.html
  ______________________________________________________________________
  
CERT/CC Contact Information

  Email: cert@cert.org
         Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
         Fax: +1 412-268-6989
         Postal address:
         CERT Coordination Center
         Software Engineering Institute
         Carnegie Mellon University
         Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
         U.S.A.
         
  CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
  Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other
  hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
  
Using encryption

  We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
  Our public PGP key is available from
  
  http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key
      
  If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
  information.
  
Getting security information

  CERT publications and other security information are available from
  our web site
  
  http://www.cert.org/
      
  To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send
  email to cert-advisory-request@cert.org and include SUBSCRIBE
  your-email-address in the subject of your message.
  
  * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
  Patent and Trademark Office.
  ______________________________________________________________________
  
  NO WARRANTY
  Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
  Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
  Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
  implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
  fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
  results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
  does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
  patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
    _________________________________________________________________
  
  Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
  
  Copyright 2000 Carnegie Mellon University, portions copyright MIT
  University.
  
  Revision History
May 17, 2000:  Initial release

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