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HistorySep 19, 2002 - 12:00 a.m.

Security Bulletin MS02-051: Cryptographic Flaw in RDP Protocol can Lead to Information Disclosure (Q324380)

2002-09-1900:00:00
vulners.com
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Title: Cryptographic Flaw in RDP Protocol can Lead to
Information Disclosure (Q324380)
Released: 18 September 2002
Software: Microsoft Windows 2000
Microsoft Windows XP
Impact: Two vulnerabilities: information disclosure, denial of
service
Max Risk: Moderate
Bulletin: MS02-051

Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-051.asp.


Issue:

The Remote Data Protocol (RDP) provides the means by which Windows
systems can provide remote terminal sessions to clients. The protocol
transmits information regarding a terminal sessions' keyboard, mouse
and video to the remote client, and is used by Terminal Services in
Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000, and by Remote Desktop in Windows XP.
Two security vulnerabilities, both of which are eliminated by this
patch, have been discovered in various RDP implementations.

The first involves how session encryption is implemented in certain
versions of RDP. All RDP implementations allow the data in an RDP
session to be encrypted. However, in the versions in Windows 2000 and
Windows XP, the checksums of the plaintext session data are sent
without being encrypted themselves. An attacker who was able to
eavesdrop on and record an RDP session could conduct a straight-
forward cryptanalytic attack against the checksums and recover
the session traffic.

The second involves how the RDP implementation in Windows XP handles
data packets that are malformed in a particular way. Upon receiving
such packets, the Remote Desktop service would fail, and with it
would fail the operating system. It would not be necessary for an
attacker to authenticate to an affected system in order to deliver
packets of this type to an affected system.

Mitigating Factors:

Cryptographic Flaw in RDP Protocol:

    • An attacker would need the ability to capture an RDP session in
      order to exploit this vulnerability. In most cases, this would re-
      quire that the attacker have physical access to the network media.
    • Because encryption keys are negotiated on a per-session basis, a
      successful attack would allow an attacker to decrypt only a single
      session and not multiple sessions. Thus, the attacker would need to
      conduct a separate cryptanalytic attack against each session he or
      she wished to compromise.

Denial of Service in Remote Desktop:

    • Remote Desktop service in Windows XP is not enabled by default.
    • Even if Remote Desktop service were enabled, a successful attack
      would require that the attacker be able to deliver packets to the
      Remote Desktop port on an affected system. Customers who block port
      3389 at the firewall would be protected against attempts to exploit
      this vulnerability. (By default Internet Connection Firewall does
      block port 3389).

Maximum Risk Rating:

  • Internet systems: Moderate
  • Intranet systems: Moderate
  • Client systems: Moderate

Patch Availability:


THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED
"AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL
WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT
SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN
IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION
OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES
SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.

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