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  Серьезная дыра в fingerd

  Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-00:54.
fingerd

From:Przemyslaw Frasunek <venglin_(at)_FREEBSD.LUBLIN.PL>
Date:13.10.2000
Subject:[sa2c@and.or.jp: bin/21704: enabling fingerd makes files world readable]

----- Forwarded message from sa2c@and.or.jp -----

From: sa2c@and.or.jp
To: FreeBSD-gnats-submit@freebsd.org
Subject: bin/21704: enabling fingerd makes files world readable


>Number:         21704
>Category:       bin
>Synopsis:       enabling fingerd makes files world readable
>Confidential:   no
>Severity:       serious
>Priority:       medium
>Responsible:    freebsd-bugs
>State:          open
>Quarter:
>Keywords:
>Date-Required:
>Class:          sw-bug
>Submitter-Id:   current-users
>Arrival-Date:   Mon Oct 02 11:50:00 PDT 2000
>Closed-Date:
>Last-Modified:
>Originator:     NIIMI Satoshi
>Release:        FreeBSD 4.1.1-RELEASE i386
>Organization:
>Environment:

FreeBSD berkeley.us.and.or.jp 4.1.1-RELEASE FreeBSD 4.1.1-RELEASE #0: Wed Sep 27
00:28:17 JST 2000     sa2c@berkeley.us.and.or.jp:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/GENERIC  i386

>Description:

If finger takes full path name as user name, it prints out contents of
that file.  Because fingerd executes finger as local information
provider, finger /path/to/file@some.host prints /path/to/file at
some.host.

>How-To-Repeat:

finger /path/to/file@some.host

>Fix:

Index: finger.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/ncvs/src/usr.bin/finger/finger.c,v
retrieving revision 1.15.2.3
diff -u -r1.15.2.3 finger.c
--- finger.c    2000/09/15 21:51:00     1.15.2.3
+++ finger.c    2000/10/02 18:04:06
@@ -318,26 +318,19 @@

       /*
        * Traverse the list of possible login names and check the login name
-        * and real name against the name specified by the user. If the name
-        * begins with a '/', try to read the file of that name instead of
-        * gathering the traditional finger information.
+        * and real name against the name specified by the user.
        */
       if (mflag)
               for (p = argv; *p; ++p) {
-                       if (**p != '/' || !show_text("", *p, "")) {
-                               if (((pw = getpwnam(*p)) != NULL) && !hide(pw))
-                                       enter_person(pw);
-                               else
-                                       warnx("%s: no such user", *p);
-                       }
+                       if (((pw = getpwnam(*p)) != NULL) && !hide(pw))
+                               enter_person(pw);
+                       else
+                               warnx("%s: no such user", *p);
               }
       else {
               while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
                       for (p = argv, ip = used; *p; ++p, ++ip)
-                               if (**p == '/' && *ip != 1
-                                   && show_text("", *p, ""))
-                                       *ip = 1;
-                               else if (match(pw, *p) && !hide(pw)) {
+                               if (match(pw, *p) && !hide(pw)) {
                                       enter_person(pw);
                                       *ip = 1;
                               }

>Release-Note:
>Audit-Trail:
>Unformatted:


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